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!d.-Correction-Proceedings-Right to Counsel. 
that mmor 
denied of due proeess in the court. it 
such laek of the minor undue 
tah'll of him or he 1s otherwise aceorded unfair 
In a of that he has been 
due proeess of law. 
Id.-Correction-J urisdiction.-~ A 
!d.-Purpose of Juvenile Court Law.-A minor may have 
record of his derelictions may of 
§ 146 d seq.; Am.Jur., 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
§ 9; Am.Jur., Juvenile 
McK. Dig. References: 7] 
Delinquency, § 12; 




that he had served six months in a 




f'ITlniOVPf1 to elicit 
overcome, or explain 
the witness on his direct examination. 
Court of the 
a new trial. 
















the minor's character, the his 
adual age, and other relevant factors, that the said minor 
not a fit for consideration under the Juvenile 
r~aw; 
"IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the said minor Gene Law-
rence Dotson be remanded to the Court in order 
that criminal proceedings be instituted against him under 
the General La1v and the aforesaid Indictment.'' 
As indicated the order it must be assumed that the 
court, in disposing of the matter, considered that 
the defendant although a minor in years had been conducting 
himself as an adult. It appears in the record that he was 
had been moving about the country from job to 
had enlisted and been discharged from the :VIarine Corps, 
had a record of criminal conviction and had served at 
least one jail sentence. 
On the lOth of November the proceedings 
in the superior court were resumed and the defendant, repre-
,;ented counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offenses 
in the indictment and the case was set for trial. Con-
tinuances were on the 16th of November and on the 
13th of December. Counsel for the defendant consented to 
the eontinuance in each instanee. Trial was eommenced on 
the lOth of 1955. At all stages of the trial the de-
fendant vms represented counsel. On February 2 the 
defendant was found guilty in the first degree of each of 
the three eounts. On appeal he assigns as error a claimed lack 
of counsel in the juvenile court that counsel 
until shortly before trial in the superior 
that certain conduct on the part of the district 































state as pare11s 
of a n·iminal eonvidion all(l to him eoereetiYe 
and trailling. re Datdler, 194 Cal. 
: In re 81 Cal.App.2d 205 P.2d 
\\n1ile sueh millors are a,; mueh c•ntitled to ron-
109 Cal. 
as elrment,; of a fair trial tlot's 
not one of dne proeess of law in 
<•cmrt [4] '!'he faet that a minor is not pm·,vn.Nn"·",r! 
c·OHJlS('l need 110t be a denial of chw proerss in the 
rd. Wehc•r Y. 136 
; In O'Dau, 78 Cal.App.2d 3;39 [189 P.2c! 
Is when by such laek of of 
minor Ull(l.ne arhantag-P is taken of him or· he is other-
ftei·ordecl unfair tr(•atment rrsnlting in a of 
his that it eHJJ be saicl he has been deniec1 due proeess 
of law. '!'here is nothillg- in the (•acH~ to sueh 
O!" Hllfair treatnwnt. 
rc Contreras. supra, 100 7R7. is reliPd on 
defendant as holdirt!!-' that thr absPJH:e of eonn:wl 1n 
eonrt proeeedings is so graYe an error as to 
r·elease of the aeruserl. 'rhP ease does not stand for that 
hroad proposition. It appeared in that rase that the juwnile 





scope of its 
ascertained that the defendant was not 
"fit " for consideration in that and declined 
to exercise further over him. The determination 
of that the sound discretion of the 
""''"'LJ""'''" that a minor may 
haYe such record or his derelictions may be 
such a character that to make him a ward of the 
court v;-ould not aid him or serve the purposes of the court. 
v. 60 Cal.App.2d 463 [141 P.2d 37} ; 15 
Cal.Jur.2cl 631.) It appears from the order of the juvenile 
that the exercised his discretion with such con-
siderations in mind, and in so under the circumstances 
here sh01vn the defendant was not of any constitu-
\V e are aware of no authority which would deem 
in the court in this in-
stance to have been a in the criminal proceedings or 
to have resulted in a denial of clue process of law. 
As to the claimed lack of by 
counsel in the court the defendant states that about 
4 :30 p. m. on 9, an from the public 
defender's office advised him that he would him; 
that he talked with the attorney for approximately 15 minutes 
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and that he flid not talk with counsel again until the 
trial rommenrPd on the following morning. As previously 
the record shows that the defenflant was 
counsel from the public <lefNJder's offh·e at the 
Nowmber 1, at the second on November 
at the eontinuanec on the 16th of at the con-
tinuance on the 1:1th of Derembcr, and at all other of 
the eriminal proeeedings. ·while the trial commenced on .Jan-
10, one after the claimed initial the 
oprning statrments of eounsel and the questioning of witnesses 
d not begin until ,January 13. 
Thr defrndant doeR not rontend, aJH1 the record does not 
show in any respret, that there iYas a 111'<'<1 for a confC'rrnPP 
than that whieh is f'lai.med to have taken place that 
n reqnrst was made for a longer or ad(litional conferenre by 
Pithrr the rlPfendant or his eounsPl; that c-onsultation vvas in 
any way limited by the eourt or by the defendant's counsel ; 
that f'onns0l was not ade(]uatrly prrparPd for trial, or that 
defendant was in any way prejudiced by not having ron-
l'Ultrd counsrl for a longrr period. On the othrr hand, a 
rrview of the record affirmatively shows that the evidence of 
drfrndant's guilt was so owrwhPlming that no adrquatr~ 
defPnse eonl<l havP hren int<>rposed; that his attorney eon-
dnded the drfensc against thr eharg0s as wrll as eonld rrason-
have brrn rxpeeted, and that there is no evidence of a 
laek of preparation or of insufficient time in whieh to prrparP. 
ln this lattee rrgard it appPars that more than two months 
elapsPd hchvrrn arraignment and trial during which timr thr> 
pnblie defendrr was active in the ease and had available to 
him the record of thr proppedings lwforr thr grand jur~'. 
\Vhat further brncfit may have aeerued to the defendant by 
!'ontinurd ronsultations with his attorney does not appear. 
The easrs relied on by the defendant are all cases in whieh 
defendant was shown to have bren prejudiced by an appoint-
nwnt of eonm;cl in a manner or at a time which made adequaic 
l'Ppresentation impossible (Powrll Y. Alabama, 287 n.s. 45 
15:1 S.Ct. 55, 77 I1.Ed. 158. 84 A.LR 5271; People v. Chesser. 
Cal.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761. 170 A.hH. 246]). or b:r thP 
appointment of eounsp] who failPd to eondnct himRelf in the 
best interesh; of the defendant (Pcop7c Y. Avilez, 86 Cal. 
App.2d 289 fl 94 P.2d 829]), or b;' the affinnatiw denial of 
the right to eonsu1t with or be rrpersrntrd by vonnsrl of the 
defPndmJt'R own ehoirr at all sial!es of a l'riminal proceeding 
46 C.2d-29 
898 PEOPLR 
38 Cal.2d 230 P.2d v. 
213 P.2d 317] ; People v. McGarvy, 61 
P.2d ; People v. Simpson, 31 Cal..App. 
62 697 [217 P. 
797 P. 965] .) In the 
not denied the defendant for any 
of 
The defendant's contention that the district attorney 
of misconduct is basea upon three "'"'"""'""'"" 
[8] It is contended first that it was mis-
conduct to question the defendant ou cross-examination con-
bad cheek passing in the State of Oregon. The 
defendant first raised this question when he testified on 
r:xamination that he had passed a check in Oregon, and on 
cross-examination the district attorney further pursued the 
subject. Two of the questions asked concerning the number 
of checks passed were not answered on the advice of the court, 
and the district attorney succeeded in bringing out no informa-
tion not testified to on direct examination. 
[9] It is next contended that the district attorney improp-
erly asked whether the defendant had received an undesirable 
discharge from the Marine Corps. On direct examination the 
defendant had testified that he had been a member of the 
Marine Corps and had been discharged at the age of 17, and 
on cross-examination the district attorney brought out that 
the defendant had received a dishonorable discharge, later 
f'nbstituted by a general discharge under honorable conditions. 
[10] It is finally contended that the district attorney im-
properly brought to the jury's attention the fact that the 
defendant had served time in jail. Again this was first 
brought out on direct examination when the defendant testified 
that he had served six months in a county jail in Oregon, and 
denied having made statements that he had served time else-
where. On cross-examination the district attorney obtained 
no further admissions from the defendant. 
[11] It is well established that the scope of proper cross-
examination may extend to the whole transaction of which the 
witness has testified, or it may be employed to elicit any 
matter which may tend to overcome. qualify or explain the 
testimony given by a witness on his direct examination. 
(People v. W estek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 476 [190 P.2d 9] ; People v. 
Tyren, 179 Cal. 575, 580 [178 P. 132].) The defendant has 
failed to show that he was not adequately represented by 












































CAHTEH, ,J.~--1 dissent. 
or that the 
l'eeeived a 
for 
It is my that the minor here involved was 
due process of law lwnl\ISP of iadz of eonnsel ill the 
rt proccediJJgs. 
Dc>fendant was <W<·.used of a St'l'ious ; he was rPm<:wdt"d 
the juvellile eouri h<'<·au:-w of his agt•. ! 11 the 
only que::;tioll determi1wd, sa far as t!u: record i:-; 
wht•iher (Jl' not dPfenclant was a fit subjed. for the eonsidt"t'a 
1 ion of that r:ourt. Sine<~ he was mHloubtt:dly a minor, lH' 
11as within thai eourt's jurisdietion if that court, in tltt• 
(·xereise of it:.; diseretion, saw fit to retain it;; jurisdietion over 
him. It eannot be denied that defendant futun~ would have· 
lweu an entirely !liffeJ·,~ut matter had the juvenile eourt n·· 
laiued jurisdidion rather tlum him tu the superio1· 
<·ourt. fm trial on the felony dwrges. !f defl'ndant had bet•IJ 
with eounsel at that time so that he eould havP 
tlefeuded himself on the issue then iuvolved, it i:-; very probable 
I hat the outr:ome would ha Ye been differellt. 'l'he California 
'onstitutiou (art. I, § 18) provides that in eriminal prosec:n-
t ions "in any court whatever" the party accused shall haw 
1 he right to appear and defend in p('rson and with counsel. 
t has been said, and. is said again here in the majority 
opinion, that proceedings in the juvenile court are not <<l'illl-
inal in nature even though the charge is a erimina! oJJe. II 
ppears to me that when the eharge is a criminal Ollll, alld 
particularly when it is as SPrious as the one involn•d hen'. 
the proeeedings should be c·onsidered eriminal in nature 
am! the aecmsed be ac~eorded all the safeguards intended for 
his protection. In In r-e Contreras, 109 CaLApp.2d 787, 789 
1241 P.2d fi:31], it was said: '·While tht· juvenile eourt law 
that adjutlieation of a mixwr to be a ward of the 
eourt shall Hot lw deemed to bP a t•onvietiou of crime, uewr-
t heless, for all pradieal purpo,.;e:-;, this is a legal fietlon, 
presenting a ehalleug-e to t~rednlity and doillg- violenc~t~ to 
reason. Courts <·annot and ,dll not ,.;}mt tht·ir eyes and t·at·,.; 
900 PEOPr~E v. DoTSON [46 C.2d 
to everyday contemporary happenings.'' It was also said 
p. 790): "Surely, a minor charged in the juvenile 
eonrt with acts denoune<•d by law as a felony does not have 
lesser constitutional, statutory rights or guarantees than are 
afforded an adult under similar circumstances in the superior 
eourt. . . . In practically all of the eases affecting juvenile 
court proceedings that have come to our attention, the minor 
has admitted the charg·e lodged against him and the only prob-
lem presented to the court was hovv to best guide and control 
the minor with a view to his rehabilitation and further de-
velopment. In the case at bar however, the minor emphati-
eally and at all times denied his alleged delinquency. Under 
such circumstances his liberty should not be taken from his 
[sic] until his guilt of the charges judged against him was 
established by legal evidence. That however praiseworthy, 
aceording to the viewpoint of the individual, may be the 
motives of the juvenile court, that tribunal may not impinge 
upon the legal rights of one brought before it is emphatically 
set forth in In re Tahbel, 46 Cal.App. 755, 760, 761, 762, 763 
I 189 P. 804]; in In re Hill, supn~, pp. 26, 27, 28 [78 Cal.App. 
23 (247 P. 591)] ; and in In re Rauch, 10:1 Ca1.App.2d 690, 698 
I 230 P.2d 115]. In the jina.l analysis the j!lvenile court is a 
judimal institution." (Emphasis added.) In In re Pojf, 
n35 ]'.Supp. 224, 227, the Contreras case was approved, and 
it was held that the l<"gislative intent was to enlarge, not to 
diminish the constitutional protections afforded a minor. The 
eonrt there conduded: ''I hold only that where a child com-
mits an act, which aet if committed by <lll adult would con-
stitute a crime, then due procetis in the Juvenile Court re-
quires that the child be advised that he is entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel, and this is so even though the 
,Juvenile Conrt in making dispositions of delinquent children 
is not a criminal court. '' 
In the majority opinion it is said that there is nothing in 
the present record to show that the minor defendant here was 
deprived of his rights or denied due process of law. When 
the gravity of the charge is taken into eonsideration, it seems 
to me that the lack of counsel to advise defendant was a 
tleprivation of due process in the jnn~nile court proceedings 
which nre judic.ial proceedings. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
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